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“I am opposing a social order in which it is possible for one man
who does absolutely nothing that is useful to amass a fortune of
hundreds of millions of dollars, while millions of men and wo-
men who work all the days of their lives secure barely enough
for a wretched existence.”
—Eugene V. Debs1
I. INTRODUCTION
Even the wealthiest among us would be staunchly opposed to
the idea that their income be commensurate with their productiv-
ity. Warren Buffet, who is estimated to earn $1.54 million per
hour,2 would certainly lose out if his income were determined by
his literal physical output, without regard for any additional fac-
tors. It would be antithetical to common sense to, in the name of
social welfare, subject only some of the most vulnerable members of
society to such a requirement. Yet, in allowing people with a disa-
bility to be paid below the federal minimum wage, section 14(c) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) does just this.3
Enacted in 1938 by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the
FLSA created fundamental and critical workers’ rights as basic as
the guarantee of a minimum wage,4 overtime pay,5 and child labor
protections.6 Section 14(c) of the FLSA, a seemingly innocuous
provision, purports to “prevent curtailment of opportunities for
employment” for individuals with disabilities.7 In setting out to do
so, this provision permits employees with a physical or mental disa-
bility to be paid at rates below the otherwise applicable federal
minimum wage, commensurate with their productivity, as deter-
mined by their employer.8
This New Deal-era legislation, though progressive for its time,9
has since lost pace with modern conceptions of disability rights and
1 JYOTSNA SREENIVASAN, 1 POVERTY AND THE GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: A HISTORI-
CAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 199 (vol. 1 2009). Eugene Victor Debs, an American union leader,
made this statement to the trial court upon his conviction for violating the Sedition
Act on September 18, 1918. Id.
2 Julia La Roche, Here’s How Much 10 of the Richest People in the World Made Per
Minute in 2013, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-
warren-buffett-makes-per-hour-2013-12 [http://perma.cc/W78T-EMV4].
3 See 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (2015).
4 Id. § 206.
5 Id. § 207.
6 Id. § 212.
7 Id. § 214(c)(1).
8 See id.
9 See WILLIAM G. WHITTAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30674, TREATMENT OF
WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES UNDER SECTION 14(C) OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
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values.10 Dating back to the 1930s, section 14(c) was a mechanism
used to protect employment opportunities in a time when there
were virtually no employment prospects in the mainstream
workforce for workers with a disability.11 The once-grim realities of
a bygone era continue to cast a shadow on workers’ and disability
rights, retrospectively and more than likely prospectively, placing
us on the wrong side of history.
The 14(c) program is antiquated with respect to disability
rights as well as in its construction of the employee-employer rela-
tionship. Proponents of section 14(c) often attribute the loss of
wages to the “therapeutic” benefits that the individual derives from
working.12 This conception perpetuates the notion that employ-
ment is strictly an economic arrangement that is not intended to
be therapeutic or fulfilling, and moreover, that deriving such psy-
chological benefits should result in decreased compensation. How-
ever, employed people are generally more satisfied with their lives
than unemployed people,13 as all workers reap the therapeutic
benefits of work—such as income, sense of purpose, social relation-
ships, structured time, skill development, and creativity.14 Sigmund
Freud identified the two most fundamental components of mental
health as “the ability to love and to work.”15 Nonetheless, section
14(c) supports the notion that people with a disability should be
financially accountable for acquiring the therapeutic benefits of
work, and in doing so, it reinforces the fallacy that work should not
be therapeutic. Repealing section 14(c) must begin with a reevalu-
7-8 (2005), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1211&
context=key_workplace [http://perma.cc/64DB-UJG5].
10 See Transition to Integrated and Meaningful Employment Act, H.R. 188, 114th
Cong. § 2 (2015) (“Today, advancements in vocational rehabilitation, technology,
and training provide disabled workers with greater opportunities than in the past, and
the number of such workers in the national workforce has dramatically increased.”).
11 See id.; Fair Wages for Workers with Disabilities Act, H.R. 831, 113th Cong.
(2013).
12 See Anna Schecter, Disabled workers paid just pennies an hour—and it’s legal, NBC
NEWS (June 25, 2013), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/25/1906
2348-disabled-workers-paid-just-pennies-an-hour-and-its-legal [http://perma.cc/R5JJ-
78BM].
13 Stefan Priebe et al., Employment Attitudes Toward Work, and Quality of Life Among
People with Schizophrenia in Three Countries, 24 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 469 (1998).
14 Id.
15 Frequently Asked Questions, FREUD MUSEUM LONDON, http://www.freud.org.uk/
about/faq/ [http://perma.cc/QW77-NNF4] (“This formula was cited by Erik Erikson
but it is not to be found in Freud’s works, although . . . [i]n ‘Civilization and Its
Discontents’ (1930) he wrote: ‘The communal life of human beings had, therefore, a
two-fold foundation: the compulsion to work, which was created by external necessity,
and the power of love . . .’.”).
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ation of societal conceptions about the meaning of work, as well as
our assumptions about why people work.16
Section 14(c) has splintered the disability rights community.
Some believe that the program discriminates against, isolates, and
underpays workers, while others maintain that section 14(c) is a
necessary apparatus for creating sustainable employment opportu-
nities for workers with a disability.17 Although the latter remains a
viable concern, its dogmatic prominence has permitted the tail to
wag the dog such that concerns surrounding lack of employment
opportunities for people with a disability has come at the expense
of exploiting that same workforce.18
This exploitation has become increasingly salient—so much so
that in 2001, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) re-
ported that more than half of all section 14(c) workers were paid
$2.50 per hour or less.19 While remaining cognizant of the real
threats posed to the livelihood of workers with a disability in the
absence of section 14(c), it cannot go unacknowledged that a law
that is devoid of any discernable protections and that facially dis-
criminates against an entire group of people based on characteris-
tics particular to them, was defective from its inception.
Nonetheless, this sub-minimum wage program has largely been ig-
nored by legal and academic scholarship.
This Note argues for the repeal of section 14(c) of the FLSA.
Part II recounts the historical and modern political development
of the “special minimum wage program.”20 Part III outlines the
14(c) program, including eligible participants, the administration
and implementation of the program as well as its oversight, or lack
thereof. Part IV identifies the pitfalls of the program, which have
resulted in exploitation of workers with a disability. Part V argues
that the program, which distinguishes between workers whose pro-
ductivity may be lower due to disability and workers whose produc-
tivity may be low due to other reasons, violates the Fourteenth
16 See John Cicero, TNS, Inc.—The National Labor Relations Board’s Failed Vision of
Worker Self-Help to Escape Longterm Health Threats from Workplace Carcinogens and Toxins,
24 STETSON L. REV. 20, 79 (1994) (describing the transformation of the status of
workers).
17 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-886, SPECIAL MINIMUM WAGE PRO-
GRAM: CENTERS OFFER EMPLOYMENT AND SUPPORT SERVICES TO WORKERS WITH DISABILI-
TIES, BUT LABOR SHOULD IMPROVE OVERSIGHT 1 (2001) [hereinafter GAO], www.gao
.gov/new.items/d01886.pdf [http://perma.cc/NCE4-MJFL].
18 Id. at 3-5 (reporting the lack of federal oversight of the 14(c) program that leads
to systematic exploitation of workers with a disability employed under the program).
19 Id. at 6.
20 See GAO, supra note 17.
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Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Part VI
explains why productivity, as a sole criterion, is an inaccurate mea-
surement of the value of one’s work and creates a problematic con-
struction of the employer-employee relationship. Finally, Part VII
seeks to correct the assumption that work is a purely economic ar-
rangement by noting the intrinsically therapeutic value work has
for all individuals and for society. Part VIII concludes by suggesting
a potential remedy for the problems created by section 14(c).
II. POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 14(C)
OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
An old proverb, “a rolling stone gathers no moss,”21 can be
read to reflect the idea that laws should not remain stagnant, but
are intended to keep pace with the ever-evolving values and views
of society. However, the recent political advancement of the sub-
minimum wage program, much like its history, can be categorized
as largely stagnant.22 One can speculate that this absence of inertia
is not due to lack of need or cause for change. Although society’s
understanding of disability and the opportunities available to peo-
ple with a disability has progressed immensely since the 1930s, sec-
tion 14(c) has not.23 This incongruity requires change.
A. History of the Sub-minimum Wage Certificate Program
Section 14(c) has its roots in the National Industrial Recovery
Act (“NIRA”) of 1933-1935, which arranged a productivity-based
sub-minimum wage system for persons with a disability.24 Under
this system, minimum wages for workers with a disability were set at
75% of the industry minimum in competitive industries.25 How-
ever, there was no floor wage set for facility work centers, where the
pay rate remained tied to productivity.26 After the NIRA was de-
clared unconstitutional in 1935,27 this productivity-aligned system
of calculating wages was reestablished in 1938 with the passage of
21 See NABIL M. MUSTAPHA, ECONOMICS: THE HISTORICAL, RELIGIOUS & CONTEMPO-
RARY PERSPECTIVES: A TREATISE 316 (2009) (“A ‘rolling stone gathers no moss’ can be
contrasted with a stagnant one covered with moss.”).
22 See The Issue of Fair Wages for Workers with Disabilities, NAT’L FED’N OF THE BLIND,
https://nfb.org/fair-wages [https://perma.cc/G98Y-X2XD].
23 See Transition to Integrated and Meaningful Employment Act, H.R. 188, 114th
Cong. (2015).
24 See WHITTAKER, supra note 9, at 6.
25 Id. at 7.
26 Id.
27 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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section 14(c) of the FLSA.28
The concept of a sub-minimum wage was raised by then-Labor
Secretary Frances Perkins during the hearings preceding the pas-
sage of the FLSA.29 Perkins suggested that a sub-minimum wage
should be enforced for “substandard workers” whom she described
as “persons who by reasons of illness or age or something else are
not up to normal production.”30 Under the FLSA, the Department
of Labor (“DOL”) was designated as the “Wage and Hour Adminis-
trator” and was charged with determining the wage floor for per-
sons with a disability.31 It was in 1938 that the DOL ruled that
wages should be set “on the basis of earning capacity,” or the literal
physical output of a worker.32
Although a counsel was established to administer the 14(c)
program, this group was composed solely of representatives from
charitable institutions and employers.33 It is notable that no spokes-
person for workers with a disability took part in formulating the
program that was set in place to help them.34 Upon Congressional
adoption of the FLSA, while Americans were struggling to break
from the grips of the Great Depression, President Roosevelt char-
acterized the Act as “the most far-reaching, far-sighted program for
the benefit of workers ever adopted in this or any country.”35
After nearly three decades of dormancy, the sub-minimum
wage provision was modified in 1965 to include a minimum wage
floor,36 ensuring that employees with a disability would be paid no
less than 50% of the statutory minimum wage.37 In 1978, legislation
was proposed to exclude persons with vision impairment from the
14(c) program.38 Although that proposal was denied, it catalyzed a
conversation about the 14(c) program that brought to light some
of its deficiencies, including the lack of federal oversight which al-
lowed the program to be administered by ill-trained
management.39
28 WHITTAKER, supra note 9, at 8.
29 Id. at 7.
30 Id. (emphasis omitted).
31 Id. at 8.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Broadcast from the White House (May 24, 1938), http://
teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/radio-address-of-the-president
[http://perma.cc/6MD3-KTL2].
36 See WHITTAKER, supra note 9, at 9.
37 Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 501(d), 80 Stat. 830, 842-45 (1966).
38 See WHITTAKER, supra note 9, at 11.
39 See id. at 11-13.
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In 1980, following the publication of two investigative articles
by The Wall Street Journal about the employment of the blind in New
York City, the House Subcommittee on Labor Standards con-
ducted two days of hearings regarding oversight of the 14(c) pro-
gram.40 While the hearings yielded no legislative action, a GAO
report released in 1981 concluded that the goal of providing a
guaranteed 50% of the prevailing minimum wage had not been
realized due to exemptions that permitted payment at a lower
rate.41 Rather than increasing oversight or drafting legislation that
would achieve the goal of paying workers with a disability at least
half of what workers without a disability are paid, the GAO report
recommended that the FLSA be modified to eliminate the wage
floor for workers with a disability altogether.42 Congress adhered to
the recommendation and removed the wage floor requirement
from section 14(c) in 1986.43 As it currently stands, the statute au-
thorizing the 14(c) program likewise contains no wage floor and
permits workers with a disability to be paid below the minimum
wage at a rate “commensurate with those paid to nonhandicapped
workers”44 and “related to the individual’s productivity.”45
B. Current Political Disposition of the Sub-minimum Wage Certificate
Program
Recent Congressional efforts to ameliorate or repeal this pro-
vision have been unsuccessful.46 The Fair Wages for Workers Act,
House Bill 3086, was proposed in 2011 and died on the House
floor.47 House Bill 3086 was intended to guarantee a fair wage to
workers with a disability by prohibiting the Secretary of Labor from
issuing any new “special wage certificates,” which permit individu-
als with disabilities to be paid below the minimum wage, and pre-
scribed a three-year phase-out of all existing sub-minimum wage
40 Id. at 14.
41 Id. at 21 (explaining that exemptions for training, evaluation, etc. had led to the
lower pay rate).
42 Id. at 23-24.
43 Pub. L. No. 99-486, 100 Stat. 1229 (Oct. 16, 1986).
44 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1)(B) (2015).
45 Id. § 214(c)(1)(C).
46 See Fair Wages for Workers with Disabilities Act of 2011, H.R. 3086, 112th Cong.
(2011), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3086 [https://per
ma.cc/7YQL-7UGK]; Fair Wages for Workers with Disabilities Act of 2013, H.R. 831,
113th Cong. (2013), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/831
[https://perma.cc/4CVG-QHP8].
47 H.R. 3086, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3086/ac
tions [https://perma.cc/LH6F-UY4H].
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certificates.48 Similar legislation, the Fair Wages for Workers with
Disabilities Act of 2013, House Bill 831, was subsequently proposed
and then referred to the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections
in April of 2013.49 No action is currently scheduled on the bill.50
Although there has been some activism surrounding section
14(c), Ari Ne’eman, co-founder of the Autistic Self Advocacy Net-
work, believes we are unlikely to see any action on this issue in
Congress in the near future, stating, “[t]here doesn’t seem to be
any appetite on the part of the traditional supporters [of rights of
people with a disability] to go after FLSA at this time.”51 The most
recent legislative action surrounding this issue is the Transition to
Integrated and Meaningful Employment Act, or “TIME Act,” intro-
duced in Congress on January 7, 2015.52 Like House Bills 3086 and
831, the TIME Act also seeks to halt the issuing of “special wage
certificates” and prescribes a three-year phase-out of all existing
sub-minimum wage certificates as well as the ultimate repeal of the
law.53 However, in line with Ne’eman’s prediction,54 GovTrack esti-
mates just a two percent chance of the bill’s enactment.55
III. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARD ACT’S SECTION 14(C)
SUB-MINIMUM WAGE CERTIFICATE PROGRAM
For nearly eighty years, section 14(c) of the FLSA has affected,
and continues to affect, hundreds of thousands of workers with a
disability annually.56 Nonetheless, the program has largely been
left out of the conversation among workers rights’ and disability
advocates alike.57 The lack of federal oversight of the program has
left it to be administered almost entirely by employers, many of
48 Id.
49 H.R. 831, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/831/all-ac
tions [https://perma.cc/25YP-JHGV].
50 Id.
51 Bruce Vail, For Goodwill’s Disabled Workers, Spotlight is on Subminimum Wage, MOY-
ERS & CO. (Nov. 12, 2013), http://billmoyers.com/2013/11/12/for-goodwill%E2%80
%99s-disabled-workers-spotlight-is-on-subminimum-wage/ [http://perma.cc/BW29-
XXPX].
52 Transition to Integrated and Meaningful Employment Act, H.R. 188, 114th
Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/188
[https://perma.cc/TL73-3M7N].
53 Id.
54 See Vail, supra note 51.
55 See H.R. 188: TIME Act, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
114/hr188 [https://perma.cc/PU26-CVL7].
56 GAO, supra note 17, at 18 (estimating that, when they conducted their 2001
survey, 424,000 workers with a disability were being paid the “special minimum
wage”).
57 See Vail, supra note 51.
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whom profit from paying the workers a lesser wage.58 Section 14(c)
has remained frozen in time and become somewhat of an anomaly.
A. Eligible Participants of the 14(c) Program
Currently, more than 5,600 employers pay sub-minimum wage
rates to approximately 424,000 workers nationwide.59 In order for
an employer to be authorized to pay a sub-minimum wage, the em-
ployer must receive a certificate from the Wage and Hour Division
of the DOL.60 These certificates are issued to four types of employ-
ers: work centers, hospital or residential care facilities, and business
and school-work exploration programs.61 The FLSA grants the Sec-
retary of Labor the authority to issue “special certificates,” or sub-
minimum wage certificates, that permit employers to set the wages
of persons with a disability at a level reflective of their productiv-
ity.62 All persons with a disability are eligible to be paid the sub-
minimum wage under the 14(c) program.63 For purposes of sec-
tion 14(c), qualifying disabilities include both physical and mental
disabilities, and may be related to age or injury, including blind-
ness, mental illness, intellectual disabilities, alcoholism, and drug
addiction.64 The largest demographic that is employed under the
14(c) program—approximately 74%—are those who have been di-
agnosed with an intellectual disability.65
B. How Wages are Set and Determined by Employers
Pursuant to fact sheets that serve as guidance documents for
regulations promulgated by the DOL, employers in the 14(c) pro-
gram determine an hourly wage by measuring the productivity of a
worker.66 Employers measure productivity by conducting time stud-
ies, in which the measured productivity of the worker with a disabil-
ity is compared against the quality and quantity of work performed
58 See GAO, supra note 17, at 27-34.
59 GAO, supra note 17, at 1.
60 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1) (2015).
61 GERALD MAYER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
(FLSA): AN OVERVIEW 5 (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42713.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9UU-QZCP].
62 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1)(A)-(C).
63 Id.
64 MAYER ET AL., supra note 61, at 5.
65 GAO, supra note 17, at 3.
66 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #39 E: DETERMINING
HOURLY COMMENSURATE WAGES TO BE PAID WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES UNDER SECTION
14(C) OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) [hereinafter DOL FACT SHEET
#39E], http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs39e.pdf [http://perma.cc/
Q37T-29TF].
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by an “experienced worker who does not have a disability.”67
An employer conducting a time study first determines the
length of time that it takes an experienced worker who does not
have a disability to perform a given task, usually by using a stop-
watch to time the experienced worker.68 The wage that a worker
with a disability will be paid is then determined by comparing the
performance of the experienced worker without a disability against
the time it takes a worker with a disability to perform the same
task.69 The employers are required to conduct these time studies in
conditions that emulate the work environment by taking into ac-
count the tasks to be performed and a variety of factors that may
influence the work, including the method, materials, and equip-
ment to be used as well as the location, the time of day, or the need
to work in extreme heat.70
The DOL provides the example that, if a worker with a disabil-
ity was 60% as productive as an experienced worker who does not
have a disability performing the same job, the wage for the worker
with a disability would be 60% of the wage of the worker who does
not have a disability.71 If the experienced worker without a disabil-
ity earned $8.00 per hour, the 14(c) worker in the aforementioned
scenario would earn $4.80 per hour ($8.00 multiplied by 60%) for
performing essentially the same type of work.72 Given the enor-
mous potential for exploitation that arises when the employer who
profits from paying employees a lesser wage is the same one con-
ducting the time studies, one would certainly assume that such a
program would merit a substantial amount of federal oversight.
However, available data suggests that such an assumption is dubi-
ous at best.73
C. Oversight of the 14(c) Program
Although the DOL is responsible for oversight of 14(c),74 a
report by the GAO found that the DOL does not compile data on
which employers are complying with the provisions of section
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 GAO, supra note 17, at 27-34 (reporting that the program greatly lacks federal
oversight).
74 Id. at 1.
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14(c), including whether section 14(c) workers are underpaid.75
Employers are required to review the wages of all employees annu-
ally to reflect changes in productivity and in the prevailing wage
rate paid to experienced workers without a disability.76 Employers
are also required to evaluate the productivity of each section 14(c)
worker at least every six months, or whenever there is a change in
the methods or materials used.77 However, the DOL “does not sys-
tematically conduct self-initiated investigations of employers” to
verify that their assessments of section 14(c) workers’ productivity
levels and wage rates are in compliance with the program.78 This is
so even though the GAO reports that the DOL provides minimal
training to employers on how to correctly compute “special mini-
mum wages.”79
This enormous deficit of oversight leaves the group of people
it was intended to protect—individuals “whose earning or produc-
tive capacity is impaired by age, physical or mental deficiency, or
injury”80—vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of employers.
According to employers’ unchecked81 assessments, approximately
70% of their section 14(c) workers are less than half as productive
as the workers without disabilities performing the same jobs.82
These reportedly low productivity levels are intended to explain
why more than half of all section 14(c) workers were paid $2.50 per
hour or less in 2001.83
IV. “PEOPLE ARE PROFITING FROM EXPLOITING
DISABLED WORKERS”
As recognized in the recently proposed TIME bill, the fact that
employers can pay their workers less than the federal minimum
wage creates an incentive for them to exploit cheap labor.84 In
seeking to prevent the curtailment of opportunities for employ-
ment for people with a disability,85 Congress of more than seventy
75 Id. at 4-5.
76 29 C.F.R. § 525.1 (2015).
77 DOL FACT SHEET #39E, supra note 66, at 2.
78 GAO, supra note 17, at 5.
79 Id.
80 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1).
81 GAO, supra note 17 (noting that there is no systematic oversight of employers’
assessments).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Transition to Integrated and Meaningful Employment Act, H.R. 188, 114th
Cong. (2015).
85 See 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1).
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years ago presumably never envisioned the creation of a two-tiered
system where employers could profit from openly discriminating
against an entire class of workers with the backing and sanction of
the law. Regardless of the statute’s stated purpose, the resulting
exploitation has become increasingly newsworthy.86
“People are profiting from exploiting disabled workers,” stated
Ari Ne’eman, president of the Autistic Self Advocacy Network.87
“We are certainly in favor of paying our handicapped clients the
minimum wage . . . ,” said Dean Phillips of Goodwill Industries at a
Congressional hearing on section 14(c), “when and where they can
earn it.”88 Goodwill Industries is among the nonprofit groups that
partake in the sub-minimum wage certificate program.89 Although
Goodwill is a multibillion-dollar company whose executives make
six-figure salaries,90 DOL records have documented cases where
Goodwill has paid workers under the 14(c) program as low as 41,
38 and 22 cents per hour.91 Unfortunately, such abhorrent condi-
tions are not uncommon and have increasingly become the topic
of recent news stories.92
The Department of Justice found that Rhode Island and the
city of Providence had paid workers with a disability under the
14(c) program in publicly funded job programs an hourly wage of
$1.57, with one individual earning just fourteen cents per hour.93
Public outcry against the 14(c) program has intensified since the
news story broke in 2009 documenting the horrifying conditions
found at a meat processing plant, Henry’s Turkey Service.94 There,
under the 14(c) program, twenty-one men with intellectual disabil-
ities were boarded at a century-old schoolhouse in Iowa in what The
New York Times referred to as conditions of “servitude.”95 The men,
ranging in age from forty to sixty-years old spent most of their
adult lives working for “next to nothing” and lived in “dangerously
86 See, e.g., Dan Barry, The ‘Boys’ in the Bunkhouse, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/03/09/us/the-boys-in-the-bunkhouse.html; Vail,
supra note 51; Schecter, supra note 12.
87 Schecter, supra note 12.
88 See WHITTAKER, supra note 9, at 17.
89 Id.
90 Schecter, supra note 12.
91 Id.
92 See, e.g., Barry, supra note 86; Vail, supra note 51; Schecter, supra note 12.
93 Vail, supra note 51.
94 See Barry, supra note 86 (stating that reporter Clark Kauffman helped expose
the abuse and neglect in 2009); Yuki Noguchi, A ‘Wake-Up Call’ To Protect Vulnerable
Workers from Abuse, NPR (May 16, 2013, 4:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/05/16/
184491463/disabled-workers-victory-exposes-risks-to-most-vulnerable.
95 Barry, supra note 86.
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unsanitary conditions.”96 The men, who were hit, kicked, hand-
cuffed and verbally abused, were paid just $2 per day.97 Referenc-
ing the 14(c) program, a Letter to the Editor in The New York Times
noted that although the unimaginable abuse in Iowa had come to
an end, “the Labor Department continues to allow the exploitation
of developmentally disabled workers throughout the country.”98
However, Goodwill, which has heavily lobbied Congress not to
repeal section 14(c),99 justifies their support for the program on
the basis of “self-determination,” reasoning that workers have a
right to choose whether to participate.100 Terry Farmer, of the disa-
bility rights group ACCSES, also supports the federal policy behind
section 14(c) on the basis of “self-determination,” or that it enables
individuals with a disability to make an “informed choice.”101 This
is based on the premise that section 14(c) essentially provides jobs
to individuals who otherwise would not qualify for such employ-
ment.102 At a Congressional hearing in 1980, General Council for
one section 14(c) employer insisted that if a person with a disability
“were to receive the minimum wage regardless of [his] . . . produc-
tivity . . . [it could] inhibit his motivation toward increased upward
mobility and in reality encourage less productivity.”103
However, many people with a disability have found their op-
tions more restricted as a result of section 14(c), as they do not
always have a choice to work at jobs that will pay them a minimum
wage.104 Harold Leigland, a sixty six-year old Goodwill employee
and former massage therapist with a college degree who is paid
$5.46 per hour, believes that the company pays him a low wage
because they know he has few alternatives.105 “We are trapped. Eve-
rybody who works at Goodwill is trapped,” he says.106 Leigland’s
96 Noguchi, supra note 94.
97 Id.
98 Gabriel Fenigsohn, Letter to the Editor, Disabled Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/opinion/disabled-workers.html?_r=0.
99 Vail, supra at note 51.
100 See GOODWILL INDUS. INT’L, INC., EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
THROUGH FLSA SECTION 14(C) 10 (2013) (explaining that the program protects the
rights of individuals to “choose” to work in such a program), http://www.goodwill
.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Goodwill-14c-Fair-Wages-Position-Paper.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XQA3-XJE8].
101 Letter from Terry R. Farmer, CEO, ACCSES, to Congresspeople (Nov. 15,
2011), http://www.accses.org/CMS/Resources/dropbox/accseslettertocommittee
leadershipopposinghr3086.pdf [http://perma.cc/2S4V-DUX2].
102 Id.
103 See WHITTAKER, supra note 9, at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 See Schecter, supra note 12.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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wife Sheila, who finds the time-study tests to be the most degrading
part of her job, quit working for Goodwill after four years when a
time study prompted the company to cut her wages from $3.50 to
$2.75 per hour.107
While there may be truth to the statement that section 14(c)
provides employment opportunities to people who otherwise
wouldn’t be able to find jobs, it seems that section 14(c) may be
creating or at least adding to this problem, rather than fixing it.
People with a disability are essentially placed in a Hobson’s choice
where they are forced to work for a discriminatory sub-minimum
wage or to not work at all. The realistic implications of section
14(c) are a degradation of the Act’s purpose to provide work op-
portunities to people with a disability.108 Section 14(c) emphati-
cally creates a tradeoff where work opportunities are achieved at
the cost of exploitation.
No similar provision in the FLSA provides for the payment of a
productivity-based sub-minimum wage to workers without a disabil-
ity. Although both workers with and without a disability could be
half as productive as an experienced worker without a disability,
only the worker with a disability could be paid below the minimum
wage as a result.109 The logical inconsistency of that fact demands
an inquiry into whether there is a rational basis for such
discrimination.
V. SECTION 14(C) VIOLATES THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S
GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The payment of a sub-minimum wage to people with a disabil-
ity due to the relatively low productivity levels of some workers is
not just unfair, it is unconstitutional. The law does not authorize
the payment of sub-minimum wages to all workers below some
specified level of productivity, but only to those with a disability.110
It is nonsensical that workers whose low productivity is the product
of apathy are guaranteed at least the minimum wage, while workers
whose productivity is a result of a disability are penalized.
The concept of a minimum wage is now well entrenched in
our society, as many recognize the exploitation that occurs in its
107 Id.
108 See 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1) (2015).
109 Id.
110 See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, THE CASE AGAINST THE SECTION 14(C) SUBMINIMUM
WAGE PROGRAM 6, https://nfb.org/images/nfb/documents/word/14c_report_sam_
bagenstos.doc [https://perma.cc/NW7U-V9E3].
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absence. It would seem farfetched to imagine certain groups of
workers without a disability to be exempt from the minimum wage
based solely on stereotypes about their productivity. However,
when the concept of paying “substandard” workers was debated at
Congressional hearings regarding the passage of the section 14(c),
some argued that the phrase should also encompass workers in cer-
tain regions of the country, namely, in the South.111 Southern
workers, they argued, were slower in movement and less produc-
tion-oriented and thus should be eligible to be paid sub-minimum
wages.112
The FLSA creates certain minimum wage exemptions for
learners, apprentices, messengers, and students.113 Those exemp-
tions apply to people because of the nature and characteristics of
the job or the learning experience they provide.114 Section 14(c),
however, denies a group of people the equal opportunity to be
paid the minimum wage for any job based on an immutable and
potentially lifelong status—being a person with a disability.115
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
commands that no State shall “deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.”116 The Supreme Court’s
seminal case of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center held that
people with a disability are a protected class for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment,117 according the classification rational ba-
sis review “with a bite.” Under rational basis review, which is used
for social or economic classifications, legislation is generally “pre-
sumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn
by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”118
“The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary
or irrational.”119 Furthermore, “a bare . . . desire to harm a politi-
111 See WHITTAKER, supra note 9, at 7.
112 Id.
113 BAGENSTOS, supra note 110, at 6 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 214(a)-(b)).
114 See BAGENSTOS, supra note 110, at 6.
115 Id.
116 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
117 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (applying a
slightly heightened form of scrutiny to a disability classification than the Court had
used in other cases, such as Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321
U.S. 342 (1944), where the Court used “true rational basis scrutiny” and was highly
deferential to the legislature).
118 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; see also U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
174-75 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
119 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
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cally unpopular group” is not a legitimate state interest.120
In City of Cleburne, the Court held that a Texas city’s municipal
zoning ordinance requiring a “special use permit” to be obtained
for the operation of a group home for individuals with an intellec-
tual disability, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.121 The Court found that there was no rational
basis for the city’s belief that a group home for persons with an
intellectual disability would pose a threat to the city’s legitimate
interests.122 The Court also held that the permit requirement was
rooted in irrational fear of, or prejudice against, people with an
intellectual disability, which is not a legitimate state interest.123
The Court first found the ordinance to raise a constitutional
issue because it facially denied respondents equal protection of the
laws.124 This is so because, although the permit was required for a
home used for the care of persons with an intellectual disability,
the city did not require a special use permit for similar buildings,
such as apartment houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormito-
ries, apartment hotels, hospitals, nursing homes, or private
clubs.125 Similarly, section 14(c) draws a distinction between peo-
ple with and without a disability, rendering people with a disability
entirely exempt from minimum wage laws.126 The discrimination
can thus be deduced from the face of the statute.
The next issue in the equal protection analysis is whether the
reason for the differential treatment is rationally related to a legiti-
mate government interest.127 The question at the heart of this anal-
ysis, the Court stated, “is whether it is rational to treat [individuals
with an intellectual disability] differently.”128 In City of Cleburne, the
Court found that there was no rational basis for the city’s concerns
involving individuals with an intellectual disability when those same
concerns did not apply to other houses permitted in the area such
as boarding and fraternity houses.129
The inquiry therefore is whether there is a rational basis for
120 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
121 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
122 Id. (finding no rational basis for why the city’s interests in avoiding population
density and lessening street congestion would apply to the group home but not to
fraternity and sorority houses or hospitals).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 450.
125 Id.
126 See 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (2015).
127 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
128 Id. at 449.
129 Id.
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exempting from the minimum wage only people whose work pro-
ductivity may be lower due to disability, but not those whose dimin-
ished productivity is due to some other cause. The statute that
includes section 14(c) states that its purpose is to prevent the cur-
tailment of opportunities for employment for individuals whose
productive capacity is impaired by “age, physical or mental defi-
ciency, or injury.”130 This is certainly a commendable ambition,
and one that would likely be found a legitimate interest of the
state. However, the means chosen to effectuate that interest, ex-
empting people with a disability from the minimum wage, is not
rationally related to it.
The basis of the statute is that according people with a disabil-
ity protection of the minimum wage would lead to curtailment of
their employment opportunities.131 The Court in City of Cleburne
held the ordinance requiring a “special use permit” unconstitu-
tional because there was no rational justification proffered for why
the city’s concerns—avoiding concentration of population and les-
sening street congestion—applied only to group homes for people
with a disability and not to fraternity or sorority houses and hospi-
tals.132 Similarly, there is no rational basis for why the concern un-
derlying the “special wage certificate”—an increase in
unemployment—applies only to people with a disability and not to
people without a disability receiving the minimum wage.
The reasoning behind section 14(c) can be analyzed in line
with the same arguments used in opposition to the general mini-
mum wage.133 Eleanor Roosevelt pointed out in her Congressional
testimony in 1959 that the same arguments raised against establish-
ing any legal minimum wage have been used repeatedly for more
than half a century.134 Two of the most common arguments used to
oppose the standard minimum wage are the threats of job loss and
economic decline.135 Some of those same arguments, namely that
the minimum wage would raise unemployment, still prevail today
and are essentially codified in section 14(c). However, the argu-
ment that a minimum wage “would ultimately harm the very work-
130 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1).
131 Id.
132 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
133 See, e.g., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT & CRY WOLF PROJECT, CONSIDER THE SOURCE:
100 YEARS OF BROKEN-RECORD OPPOSITION TO THE MINIMUM WAGE 1 (Mar. 2013),
https://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/Consider-The-Source-Minimum-
Wage.pdf [https://perma.cc/URX6-JXXE].
134 Id. at 1.
135 Id. at 3-4.
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ers it is intended to help,” has been used to criticize standard state
and federal minimum wages for more than a century.136 An analy-
sis of one-hundred years of public statements, congressional testi-
monies, editorials, media interviews and other public records
reveal that this argument has been repeatedly espoused and con-
tinuously rejected by Congress as insufficient to rebut the mainte-
nance of a minimum wage.137
Since the passage of the minimum wage, opposition groups
mainly comprised of corporations and conservative politicians have
claimed that it decreases living standards,138 or has “caused more
misery and unemployment than anything since the Great Depres-
sion.”139 As a report by the National Employment Law Project
notes, many minimum wage opponents couch their opposition in
the guise of concern for low-wage workers.140 “There is an exten-
sive record of minimum wage critics, especially elected officials, jus-
tifying their opposition to the minimum wage as defenders of the
interests of workers affected by this policy.”141
The notion that competitive wages would deprive people with
a disability of the opportunity for employment is the same argu-
ment that underlies the 14(c) program.142 Congressional findings
listed in the TIME Act report that many employers with a history of
paying sub-minimum wages benefit from philanthropic donations
and preferred status when bidding on federal contracts.143 Those
same employers claim that paying the minimum wage to their
workers with a disability would diminish their profits and reduce
their workforce.144
The continued existence of the minimum wage is evidence
that the allegation that unemployment will rise if a minimum wage
is enacted, which has been espoused in Congressional hearings,
has been rejected. Similar to the “special use permit” in City of
Cleburne, the “special wage certificate” implemented by section
14(c) is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws.
There is no rational basis for the federal government to be con-
136 See id. at 1.
137 See id. at 7-9.
138 Id. at 12.
139 Id. at 14.
140 Id. at 2.
141 Id. at 7.
142 See WHITTAKER, supra note 9, at 9.
143 Transition to Integrated and Meaningful Employment Act, H.R. 188, 114th
Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/188/text
[https://perma.cc/8BYM-M9UC].
144 Id.
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cerned that a minimum wage would cause high unemployment for
workers with lower productivity due to a disability, but not for
workers with lower productivity due to some other cause.
While the means chosen, the sub-minimum wage program,
should be found unconstitutional, the state interest, preventing the
curtailment of employment opportunities for individuals with a dis-
ability, is certainly a legitimate one. It would be absurd to create a
minimum wage exemption for all workers who are less productive
than the most experienced worker. The state must therefore find
some other way to avoid curtailing employment opportunities for
such individuals without using a law that unfairly discriminates
against them. This highlights the important role of the state in en-
suring that employment opportunities are not curtailed for people
with a disability and calls into question the barometers society uses
to gauge the value of work.
VI. PRODUCTIVITY ALONE IS NOT AN ACCURATE MEASUREMENT
OF THE VALUE OF WORK
Productivity is virtually the only standard by which section
14(c) measures the value of work.145 A vast array of problems arise
when the worth of an individual’s work is reduced to such a rigid
and narrow category. In Congressional hearings regarding section
14(c), James Gashel, speaking for the National Federation of the
Blind, exclaimed, “I am here to tell you that the safeguards are not
working.”146 The problems, he said, were largely structural: the
power imbalance permits management to make all of the decisions
and the workers are placed at a disadvantage because they enter
the workshops under the presumption of low productivity, having
to prove themselves worthy of the national minimum wage.147
A. Productivity as a Sole Criterion Undervalues Workers
Using productivity as the sole measurement has led to employ-
ers systematically devaluing their section 14(c) workers. The pro-
gram has thus created a construction of the employer-employee
relationship in which employers view their participation in section
14(c) as an act of charity, as if they are not also benefitting from
145 See 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1)(A)-(C) (2015) (allowing wages to be set “lower than
the minimum wage . . . commensurate with those paid to nonhandicapped workers,
employed in the vicinity in which the individuals under the certificates are employed,
for essentially the same type, quality and quantity of work, and related to the individ-
ual’s productivity.”).
146 See WHITTAKER, supra note 9, at 30.
147 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\19-1\CNY106.txt unknown Seq: 20  5-FEB-16 14:33
184 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:165
the participants’ work.148 This dynamic was noted over thirty years
ago when a 1979 investigative article written by The Wall Street Jour-
nal, which later prompted Congressional interest in the matter,
pointed out that to management, “its blind workers aren’t employ-
ees but ‘clients.’”149 The casting of workers as clients of their em-
ployers is a feature of the 14(c) program that continues to this
day.150 Congressional hearings have likewise made apparent that
employers do not distinguish “employee” from “client” when refer-
ring to workers with a disability, suggesting that employers believe
that they are the ones providing a service.151
It is often through sanctimonious characterizations that em-
ployers speak of their participation in the 14(c) program. For ex-
ample, a Barnes & Noble spokeswoman justified the company’s
participation in the program on her belief that it provided jobs to
“people who would otherwise not have the opportunity to work.”152
Similarly, Goodwill’s position paper on section 14(c) states that the
“special minimum wage will preserve opportunities for people with
disabilities who would otherwise lose the chance to realize the
many tangible and intangible benefits of work.”153 The testimonial
by a father of a section 14(c) worker featured in Goodwill’s posi-
tion paper goes as far as to call the job not charity but a “gift,”
stating, “Goodwill gave us the greatest gift we could ever receive: a
future!”154
Although these explanations fall squarely within Congress’s
proffered purpose of section 14(c), “to prevent curtailment of op-
portunities for employment [for individuals with a disability],”155
employees are not the only ones who benefit from such an arrange-
ment. An opinion piece in Forbes reports that employers large and
small have realized that hiring individuals with an intellectual or
developmental disability is not just a “feel-good gesture” but also a
“smart business decision with enormous dividends.”156 The article,
co-written by Carlos Slim Helu´, the second richest man in the
148 Id. at 16.
149 Id. at 13.
150 See, e.g., GOODWILL INDUS. INT’L, supra note 100.
151 See WHITTAKER, supra note 9, at 16-17.
152 Schecter, supra note 12 (internal punctuation omitted).
153 GOODWILL INDUS. INT’L, supra note 100, at 14.
154 Id.
155 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1) (2015).
156 Carlos Slim Helu´ & Anthony K. Shriver, Opinion, Pledging “I’m In To Hire” Indi-
viduals With Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, FORBES (Oct. 21, 2014 5:06 pm),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/10/21/pledging-im-in-to-hire-individu
als-with-intellectual-and-developmental-disabilities/.
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world, states, “The fact is, the profile of a worker with IDD [“intel-
lectual or developmental disabilities”] reads like that of an ideal
employee. Employees with IDD are often . . . dependable, engaged,
motivated and highly productive.”157
A study conducted by the Institute for Corporate Productivity,
or “i4cp,” analyzing the practices of high-performance organiza-
tions, strikingly reported that organizations deemed high-perform-
ance—based on measures of profitability, market share, revenue
growth, and customer satisfaction—are 37% more likely than low-
performance companies to hire a worker with a disability.158 The
high-performance companies do so for the straightforward reason
that the workers with a disability are “good talent matches for open
positions.”159 Good talent matches can be a crucial aspect of creat-
ing a work environment in which a worker can thrive. Job incom-
patibility is detrimental to both the worker and the company. For
example, Sheila Leigland, previously mentioned,160 left her em-
ployment at Goodwill when the company cut her wages from $3.99
to $2.75 per hour due to a time study.161 Leigland is blind and was
timed on her ability to complete the visually demanding task of
hanging clothing in accordance with specific requirements, includ-
ing separating the clothing by gender and facing certain
directions.162
Recent Congressional findings, as set forth in the TIME bill,
maintain that employees with a disability, when provided the
proper rehabilitation services, trainings, and tools, can be as pro-
ductive as employees without a disability.163 Moreover, even those
individuals that are considered to have the most severe disabilities
have successfully obtained employment where they earn minimum
wage and higher.164 This raises important questions: how does soci-
157 Id.
158 Elizabeth Picciuto, Hiring People with Disabilities Isn’t Just the Right Thing to Do – It’s
Good for Business, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 27, 2014 5:45 am), http://www.thedailybeast
.com/articles/2014/10/27/hiring-people-with-disabilities-isn-t-just-the-right-thing-to-
do-it-s-good-for-business.html [http://perma.cc/Y7BF-A2NY].
159 Id.
160 See Schecter, supra note 12.
161 Susan Adams, Does Goodwill Industries Exploit Disabled Workers?, FORBES (July 30,
2013 7:23 pm), http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2013/07/30/does-good-
will-industries-exploit-disabled-workers/.
162 Id.
163 Transition to Integrated and Meaningful Employment Act, H.R. 188, 114th
Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/188/text
[https://perma.cc/8BYM-M9UC].
164 Id.
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ety quantify and value work, and how correct are these
measurements?
B. What Factors Contribute to the Value of Work?
Although section 14(c) employees, like all workers, typically
benefit from working, businesses benefit from their work as well.165
While productivity is an essential part of work, it is certainly not the
only component, and in some cases may not even be the most im-
portant component. The emphasis placed on productivity by sec-
tion 14(c) is thus not only discriminatory but also unrealistic, as it
fails to reflect the many qualities that account for an individual’s
contribution to her workplace.
One study reports that more than 75% of employers from the
two-hundred organizations surveyed166 rated their employees with
an intellectual or developmental disability as “good” or “very good”
on most performance factors, including work quality, productivity,
motivation, engagement, integration with co-workers, dependabil-
ity, and attendance.167 Of great significance is the fact that produc-
tivity is just one among seven factors used to indicate an
employee’s value.168 Additionally, certain workplace tasks may be
conducted in such a way that quantifying productivity is not feasi-
ble. In a job assembling flower arrangements, for example, the aes-
thetic value of the product is essential to its worth and is something
that cannot be easily quantified. Approximately seventy-five of the
workers employed by Habitat International, Inc., a Tennessee-
based company that produces indoor and outdoor rugs, have a dis-
ability, including severe disabilities.169 CEO David Morris relies on
his company’s statistics to support his claim that workers with a dis-
ability are beneficial to business.170 Morris reports that his workers
are extremely loyal, contributing to low absenteeism and low turno-
165 See, e.g., Helu´ & Shriver, supra note 156 (reporting that companies enjoy “enor-
mous dividends” from hiring people with a disability).
166 See Eric Davis, What Your D&I Policy is Missing: Employing People with Intellectual
and Developmental Disabilities, I4CP (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.i4cp.com/trendwatch
ers/2014/10/15/what-your-d-i-policy-is-missing-employing-people-with-intellectual-
and-developmental-disabilities [http://perma.cc/2AYR-R7N5].
167 See Picciuto, supra note 158.
168 See Davis, supra note 166.
169 Our People, HABITAT INT’L, INC., http://www.habitatint.com/people.htm [http:/
/perma.cc/Y58M-Y2S3].
170 Sarah Blahovec, It’s About TIME: Ending Subminimum Wages for Workers with Disa-
bilities, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 10, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
sarah-blahovec/its-about-time-ending-sub_b_7041592.html [http://perma.cc/75L2-
MCJ7].
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ver due to job dissatisfaction or firings.171 Those qualities save costs
to the business by allowing the entire plant to be overseen by just
two managers.172 Additionally, due to the effectiveness of the work-
ers, there have been no back orders and almost no product
defects.173
In retail stores such as Goodwill, where customer service is
likely an essential part of the establishment, the employee’s ability
to interact pleasantly with customers is presumably a very valuable
quality. However, DOL guidance documents expressly state that,
“[b]ehavioral factors—such as social skills . . . willingness to follow
orders, etc.—may not be used when evaluating the workers’ pro-
ductivity.”174 Although it may be argued that the exclusion of these
characteristics could be for the benefit of certain workers, this is
not always the case. Some workers may excel in areas such as inter-
acting with customers and co-workers or the ability to follow or-
ders, and yet these skills are not accounted for in their
compensation.
Employing people with a disability also places businesses in
good standing with their communities, which companies may use
this to their advantage. Goodwill’s website, for example, advertises
its employment of people with a disability; the company’s main
webpage features a video interview of “Robbie,” a worker with a
disability employed by the company.175
The rhetoric of 14(c) employers is plagued with examples of
the many ways its employees benefit from work.176 These state-
ments are not untrue, as all people benefit from work.177 However,
it is axiomatic that employers benefit from the work of their em-
ployees, too. The idea that benefiting from one’s work is a reason
to pay that individual less178 is harmful to all workers, not just those
with a disability. Moreover, productivity is just one among many
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 How Hiring People with Disabilities Has Paid Off for Habitat International, Inc.,
HABITAT INT’L, INC., http://www.habitatint.com/payoff.htm [http://perma.cc/
6C7W-RYBR].
174 DOL FACT SHEET #39E, supra note 66.
175 GOODWILL INDUS. INT’L, INC, http://www.goodwill.org (last visited May 31,
2015).
176 See, e.g., GOODWILL INDUS. INT’L, supra note 100.
177 See Cicero, supra note 16, at 80 (“[A] transcendental reason for work that as-
sumes an almost spiritual dimension based on intrinsic human needs, such as pur-
pose, meaning, worth, fulfillment, dignity, and respect.”).
178 See Schecter, supra note 12 (statement by Goodwill International CEO Jim Gib-
bons) (“It’s typically not about their livelihood. It’s about their fulfillment. It’s about
being a part of something.”).
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factors that can be used to measure a worker’s contribution to their
work environment and to their employer.179 Using productivity as
the sole criterion, as section 14(c) does, is thus overly simplistic
and leads to a chronic undervaluing of the work done by individu-
als with a disability.
VII. RECONCEPTUALIZING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WORK
AND WHY PEOPLE WORK
Formulating processes to improve the experience of work for
people with a disability must begin with an analysis of how we un-
derstand work and our assumptions about why people work. In di-
rectly correlating the value of one’s work with productivity, section
14(c) epitomizes the concept that work is a purely economic ar-
rangement from which therapeutic benefits are not to be ex-
pected. This patently ignores the reality that a majority of people
exact psychological benefits from working,180 that work and wellbe-
ing are intrinsically linked,181 and that society as a whole benefits
when its population is employed.182
A. Work as a Purely Economic Arrangement
“Employ” is defined in the FLSA as “to suffer or permit to
work.”183 The use of the word “suffer” as not just an expectation
but also as a definition of work is telling. The repeal of section
14(c), if it were to be carried out, could not exist in a vacuum, but
would have to be accompanied by a shift in social consciousness.
This would necessarily have to begin with examining the intrinsic
value of work to an individual’s life. The prevailing consciousness
of work perceives work as “the giving up of leisure . . . in return for
compensation,”184 typically in the form of income. A central tenet
of this view is that the employment relationship is “merely a func-
tion of the market where economic prerogative is controlling.”185
The justification that employers use for section 14(c)—that
179 See Davis, supra note 166 (discussing other factors that account for the value of
an employee’s work such as work quality, motivation, engagement, integration with
co-workers, dependability and attendance).
180 Priebe et al., supra note 13, at 469 .
181 See Cicero, supra note 16, at 80.
182 See Jobs, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/
jobs [http://perma.cc/GG3P-DKNW].
183 29 C.F.R. § 525.3(g) (2015).
184 Howard Lesnick, The Consciousness of Work and the Values of American Labor Law,
32 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 843 (1983).
185 Cicero, supra note 16, at 83.
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workers with a disability are paid less in part because their employ-
ment is beneficial to them186—is precisely the construction of the
employee-employer relationship that must be corrected. Notably,
in defining the term “employ,” the FLSA expressly states that
“[t]he determination of an employment relationship does not de-
pend upon the level of performance or whether the work is of
some therapeutic benefit.”187 Although the FLSA recognizes the
existence of an employment relationship even where there is a
therapeutic benefit, the 14(c) employers seem to view the fact that
their employees derive a therapeutic benefit from work as a justifi-
cation for their decreased compensation.188 For example, when
questioned about the 14(c) program, Goodwill International CEO
Jim Gibbons, who was awarded a $729,000 salary in 2011, stated,
“It’s typically not about their livelihood. It’s about their fulfillment.
It’s about being a part of something.”189
The statement made by the Goodwill CEO suggests that earn-
ing a livelihood is not only detached from the expectation of fulfill-
ment or a sense of common purpose, but that the former is
actually at odds with the latter. This advances the jaded notion that
basic human needs, such as emotional fulfillment,190 are attained
through a trade-off of livelihood. This idea goes against other pro-
visions of the FLSA,191 and against the interests of working people
generally.
B. Work is Intrinsically Linked to Therapeutic Benefits
The reality that an individual gains more than a paycheck
from working should not be seen as an aberration, but as a norm.
For all workers, with or without a disability, there “exists a transcen-
dental reason for work that assumes an almost spiritual dimension
based on intrinsic human needs, such as purpose, meaning, worth,
fulfillment, dignity, and respect.”192 All 14(c) employees who have
a disability still have the ability to work.
On an individual level, employment has significant effects on
186 See GOODWILL INDUS. INT’L, supra note 100.
187 29 C.F.R. § 525.3(g).
188 See Schecter, supra note 12.
189 Id.
190 See generally Priebe et al., supra note 13.
191 See 29 C.F.R. § 525.3(g) (2015) (“The determination of an employment rela-
tionship does not depend upon the level of performance or whether the work is of
some therapeutic benefit.”).
192 Cicero, supra note 16, at 80.
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physical and mental health,193 as well as on subjective well-being.194
These individual benefits have widespread effects, as societies with
higher levels of employment are wealthier, more politically stable,
and healthier.195 However, in accounting for the psychological
benefits of employment, “[w]orking conditions can be as impor-
tant as job availability.”196 “Work represents many people’s main
recognised contribution to the community where they live, and it is
a source of pride and dignity; the quality of their jobs is therefore
fundamental for them.”197 The ability to work is therefore mean-
ingful only if people can be employed in a dignified manner, free
from legalized discrimination. In a series of Congressional hear-
ings on section 14(c) in 1980, Donald Elisburg, Assistant Secretary
for Employment Standards with responsibility over section 14(c),
stated that the yardstick for measuring the success of the program
“must also be measured in more human terms,” namely, “sense of
accomplishment and self-respect as well as income earned.”198
As previously mentioned, Freud believed that one of the two
most fundamental components of mental health is the ability to
work.199 In requiring people to work under the condition of ine-
quality, section 14(c) denies an entire group of people who are
able to work the ability to do so with dignity. Refocusing the em-
phasis of work from purely economic and tangible terms to intangi-
ble benefits is not merely the job of workers, but of employers as
well. In recognizing the role of work, and more importantly of the
worker in society, the importance placed on the physical output of
an employee should be deemphasized in light of the drastic psy-
chological and social advantages society as a whole derives when its
population is gainfully employed.200
C. Policies to Remedy and Replace Section 14(c) of the FLSA
If work came to be known as an entity intrinsically linked to
well being and if employment was viewed as a societal rather than
193 See generally Wilson, S.H. & Walker, G.M., Unemployment and Health: A Review, 107
PUB. HEALTH J.153, 153-62  (1993).
194 See Andrew E. Clark & Andrew J. Oswald, Unhappiness and Unemployment, 104
ECON. J. 648 (1994).
195 See OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, supra note 182.
196 OECD, HOW’S LIFE?: MEASURING WELL-BEING 58 (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10
.1787/9789264121164-en [http://perma.cc/AY3U-ETB2].
197 Id.
198 See WHITTAKER, supra note 9, at 15.
199 See Frequently Asked Questions, FREUD MUSEUM LONDON, http://www.freud.org
.uk/about/faq/ [http://perma.cc/QW77-NNF4].
200 See OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, supra note 182.
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an individual responsibility, a multitude of policies to replace sec-
tion 14(c) would become available. Although there is no one solu-
tion to this problem, there are certainly processes that can provide
equal employment opportunities to individuals with a disability. As
the recently proposed TIME Act suggests, the DOL should halt the
issuing of any new section 14(c) certificates, and a plan should be
put in place to phase out the program entirely.201 The repeal of the
sub-minimum wage program and a transition into integrated and
meaningful employment for people with a disability is essential. As
part of this process, protections would need to be put in place to
ensure that individuals with a disability are not left out of the
workforce altogether.
If the government chooses to exempt employers from paying
the minimum wage to workers with a disability, the government
should subsidize their employment to supplement the paid income
of the workers to match the minimum wage. Therefore, if a worker
is paid 50% of the minimum wage by her employer, the govern-
ment should pay the remaining 50%. This remedy would be ideal
for three primary reasons. First, as previously discussed, it is not
just the worker herself that benefits from being gainfully em-
ployed—societies as a whole are healthier, wealthier, and more po-
litically stable when their populations are employed.202 As such, the
financial burden of the sub-minimum wage, which is heavy for an
individual worker to bear, should be spread more evenly through-
out society since society benefits as well.
Second, requiring the government to subsidize the portion of
the paycheck that the employer does not pay would serve as an
incentive for government oversight of employers. Presumably, the
government would want to decrease the amount of money it
spends, and would therefore make certain that employers are pay-
ing workers an accurate wage by ensuring that they are matching
employees to compatible jobs, properly administering the time
studies and accurately reporting results. This would likely lead to
regular systematic and self-initiated reviews by the DOL of time
studies, productivity reports, and payment of workers, all of which
employers should be required to maintain in records.203 By placing
taxpayer money into the equation, the program would create gov-
ernment accountability, since all taxpayers would have an interest
201 Transition to Integrated and Meaningful Employment Act, H.R. 188, 114th
Cong. (2015).
202 See OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, supra note 182.
203 See GAO, supra note 17 (reporting that the DOL does not conduct self initiated
investigations into employer compliance with requirements of the program).
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in ensuring that employers were not paying workers with a disabil-
ity an artificially low wage. It may also give the government an in-
centive to penalize employers who fail to adequately comply with
the law, as they would be abusing not only workers but taxpayers, as
well.
Third, subsidizing the paychecks of employees to guarantee
that they are paid the minimum wage achieves the goal of prevent-
ing curtailment of employment opportunities for people a disabil-
ity while eradicating the discriminatory effects of section 14(c).
Subsidizing the employment would be an appropriate means to
achieve that government interest, and would thus comport with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that people be protected
equally by the law.204
Additionally, rather than assuming that a worker with a disabil-
ity is unable to meet the productivity requirement, there should be
a rebuttable presumption that the individual is capable of meeting
minimum productivity standards, the burden of which should be
placed on the employer to disprove.205 This would help to equalize
the power imbalance that workers feel when they enter the work-
shops under the presumption of low productivity, having to prove
themselves worthy of the national minimum wage.
If the government believes employers should have to pay a
wage that only reflects the productivity of a worker, the govern-
ment should pay the remaining wage to account for all of the bene-
fits society attains from having an employed population.
Government-subsidized wages would create incentives for taxpayers
to hold the government accountable for its policies and to ensure
that workers are not being exploited. Although there is much work
to be done in shaping these new policies, it is certain that in regard
to the sub-minimum wage program under section 14(c), we can do
better.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although well-intentioned when it was initially enacted,206 sec-
tion 14(c) of the FLSA has remained frozen in time while society
204 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
205 See MICHAEL MORRIS ET AL., SECTION 14C OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT:
FRAMING POLICY ISSUES 21 (Apr. 2002), http://bbi.syr.edu/publications/morris/Poli
cy_Report_042002.doc [http://perma.cc/5JET-33MX].
206 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1) (2015) (stating as its purpose “to prevent curtailment of
opportunities for employment . . . of individuals . . . whose earning or productive
capacity is impaired by age, physical or mental deficiency or injury”).
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has continued to progress.207 This form of state-sanctioned discrim-
ination is not an answer to a problem, but is a problem in itself.
Section 14(c) hurts not only workers with a disability, but affects all
workers by placing the actual worth of employees solely on the
quantities they produce.208 Work must be understood as intrinsi-
cally linked to well being in order for employers, as well as society,
to value the contributions of workers beyond their physical out-
put.209 Therefore, beginning with a shift in how we view work, we
can strive to reach a place where the worker will become “more
important than the object produced.”210
207 See The Issue of Fair Wages for Workers with Disabilities, NAT’L FED’N OF THE BLIND,
https://nfb.org/fair-wages [https://perma.cc/G98Y-X2XD].
208 See 29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1)(C) (requiring wages to be paid “related to the individ-
ual’s productivity”).
209 See Cicero, supra note 16, at 80; OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, supra note 182; Clark
& Oswald, supra note 194.
210 See David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the Transformation of Work, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119, 128 (1988).
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